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ABSTRACT
There is a common belief that we can expect to add value to a pros-
pect or prospect portfolio by improving the prospect chance of suc-
cess (Pg) as a consequence of acquiring information and doing
work. Established laws of probability dictate that this is incorrect.
We do expect new information to add value to the exploration
cycle, but not by an expectation of improving the prospect risk.
New information may result in an increase or a decrease of Pg,
but the expected result (the average of all possible outcomes) is
zero change. Moreover, for a typical exploration prospect (Pg <
0.5), we expect that new information will downgrade more pros-
pects Pg than are upgraded. Real-world prospect data are neither
suitable nor publically available to study this. Instead, the concept
is explored using an analogous process (prenatal prediction of fetus
gender) for which good statistics exist, and by creating a synthetic
prospect that can be analyzed in a repeatable way. The results sup-
port the predictions made above.
INTRODUCTION
There are in existence a selection of sources that deal with the esti-
mation of prospect risk (e.g., Megill, 1977; Rose, 2001), the value
of information (VoI) in the petroleum exploration business (e.g.,
Coopersmith et al., 2006; Bratvold et al., 2009), and the optimization
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of business decisions using that information (e.g.,
Bratvold and Begg, 2010). However, these include little
discussion of the way in which new information
changes our estimate of the chance of success (Pg) of
a prospect, and in particular whether we can expect
new information to improve or downgrade that
estimate.
Reading of some of these excellent texts could
indicate that we expect new information to improve
our odds; for example, Rose (2001, p. 93) states “the
most common method of improving the odds is to
acquire additional geotechnical information, such as
seismic or geochemical data.”What the casual reader
may not learn from this sentence is that the same
information could equally worsen those odds.
Other quotes that appear to support the expecta-
tion that spending time and effort on new work, new
technology, and new data should be rewarded by an
improvement in the chance of success include the
following: “effective exploration is a process of risk
reduction…” which continues until “… a stage of
rapidly diminishing returns in terms of further risk
reduction per unit of exploration information is
reached” (Duff and Hall, 1996, p. 184–185); “a
powerful battery of tools with which to reduce risk
are available” (Kaufman, 1996, p. 136); “integrating
technologies helps to reduce risk” (Bender et al.,
2010, p. 13, who also noted explicitly that the indus-
try invests significant amounts of money and time to
reduce risk); and “high risks, inherently entrenched
in any petroleum assessment and exploration … can
be reduced by using probability methods at different
stages of assessment and exploration activities”
(Divi, 2004, p. 95). Such language may give the
impression (even if that was not the intention of the
authors) that by using these tools we should expect
to improve the chance of success of a prospect.
The existence of an expectation of reward by
prospect risk reduction is also indicated by the titles
of recent international conferences, “Reducing
Subsurface Uncertainty and Risk through Field-Based
Studies” (Geological Society of London, 2014) and
“Recent Advances in Exploration Technology and
NCS Prospect Fair; Identify Opportunities—Reduce
Risk” (Geological Society of Norway, 2015).
Our own experience, based on interaction with
many individuals in different companies, is that there
is a common, but not universal, belief that effort and
money spent acquiring new information on explora-
tion prospects should result in an improved chance of
success. Our experience indicates that this belief varies
between individuals and, to some extent, between dif-
ferent companies (a reviewer of this paper noted that
he has never experienced it in his company; however,
a reviewer of a different paper stipulated that a prop-
erly designed work program should improve risk).
In consequence, experienced members of the
petroleum exploration community may have heard
the like of: “We will acquire 3-D seismic coverage
over our X Block, which will add value by de-risking
our prospects” or “Your job this year will be to remap
and mature the Y prospect to drillable status; your
performance target will include raising the prospect
Pg from 0.2 to at least 0.3.”
Implicit to such statements is a belief that is sim-
ple, seductive, and wrong; namely that, by carrying
out work or acquiring new information, we can
expect to improve the estimated chance of success
of an existing prospect or prospect portfolio. This
can have destructive results for a company that banks
its future on the expectation of improving prospect
risks or for a team or individual who lives with the
consequence of an unwinnable performance contract.
Two components of measure of the value of a
portfolio of prospects are the risked prospective
resource and the number of discoveries expected if
the portfolio is drilled out. Both of these value compo-
nents depend on the estimated chance of success of the
prospects. Peel and White (in press) discuss the belief
that we can expect to improve prospect risk by work
or new information, and suggest this is rooted in the
labor theory of value (Smith, 1776). Russell (1946, p.
578) discussed the origin of this theory, tracing it to
medieval texts stating that “value … should increase
in relation to the amount of labor which has been
expended.” The belief that effort should be rewarded
with an increase in value appeals both to our sense of
fair play and to our everyday human experience, but
it should not apply to prospect risk. Peel and White
(in press) propose two rules that should apply to how
prospect risk changes when we gain new information:
Rule (1): you should not expect to improve Pg by
acquiring new data. Some prospects will see
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improved Pg, some will become worse, but the
expected value of Pg (the average of all possible
outcomes) will be unchanged.
Rule (2): you should expect Pg to become worse for
the majority of prospects in a portfolio, although
the expected average value of Pg of the portfolio
will be unchanged.
These rules are somewhat counterintuitive, but they
are important and they should form the basis of what
we expect an exploration work plan to deliver. This
paper aims to provide more explanation and demon-
strate the significance of the rules by means of
worked examples.
RISK, CHANCE OF SUCCESS, AND
UNCERTAINTY
The concept of chance of prospect success is critical
to the understanding of prospect economics and/or
for modeling of a prospect portfolio (e.g., Allais,
1956; Newendorp, 1971, 1975; Megill, 1977; Rose,
1987, 2001). It is, therefore, vital to have a clear def-
inition of this term, but the literature remains some-
what inconsistent as to how it should be defined; we
therefore start by setting out a clear definition.
Every exploration prospect, before it is drilled,
should have a clearly defined geological success case
model describing all its components (e.g., the success
model for a notional Y prospect could be that it is a
four-way closure, containing deepwater turbidite
sands deposited in a slope channel, sealed by a marine
shale, sourced by a defined source rock, etc.). We
define the parameter ranges (e.g., reservoir porosity,
closure height, volume of migrated hydrocarbons,
etc.) that the success case geology could deliver, and
use these to calculate the range of possible hydrocar-
bon volumes that the prospect success case model as
a whole could deliver, which can be described as prob-
ability density and exceedance curves (Figure 1).
Prospect chance of geological success is our
current estimate of the likelihood that the success case
geological model is correct. This does not necessarily
equate to the chance of it encountering “enough reser-
voired oil or gas to sustain flow” (cf., Rose, 2001,
p. 33) or to the chance of it being commercially
developable.
Chance of success is referred to here as Pg fol-
lowing the terminology of Rose (1987, 1992, 2001);
other sources use different terms and abbreviations
such as probability of success-geological (POSg)
(Ross, 1997, 2004; Quirk and Ruthrauff, 2008).
Other sources refer to geological probability (GP),
geological probability of success (GPoS), and chance
of success (CoS).
The statement of the geological success case
model should be intimately linked to the expression
of the parameter ranges that the success case should
deliver. These ranges are described in terms of proba-
bility exceedance distributions, Pn, which define the
magnitude of a quantity for which there is considered
to be an n% chance of the outcome exceeding that
value (e.g., P50 corresponds to a 50% chance). Most
commonly, when applying this to exploration pros-
pects, we define an unrisked distribution, i.e., the
P50 is the volume that we expect to exceed in 50%
of the success case outcomes. The distribution of
Pn vs. n defines a success case curve; Pg is the chance
of getting on that curve.
We can state explicitly that the Pg is equivalent to
the chance of exceeding the P100 hydrocarbon vol-
ume; it is also equivalent to twice the chance of
exceeding the P50, 10 times the chance of exceeding
the P10.
The term “risk” may cause confusion because it
is used by some geoscientists as synonymous with
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Figure 1. The difference between chance of success (risk) (Pg)
and confidence for a prospect. Increasing uncertainty is reflected
by a broadening of the error range on the predicted success case
volume, which is represented by an exceedance curve (black)
and by a probability density function (gray filled curve).
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Pg, whereas others use it to mean the chance of fail-
ure (1-Pg) and therefore, we recommend restricting
use of the word to an informal, nonquantitative sense.
Further potential confusion arises from a quite differ-
ent usage of the term “risk” in the financial literature,
for example, as used in discussion of efficient frontier
models (Markowitz, 1959). Financial risk relates to
the uncertainty on future investment returns, rather
than the chance that there will be a return. It is com-
monly related to the historical volatility, determined
by the standard deviation of the historical returns of
a specific investment.
In petroleum exploration, uncertainty is distinct
from, and largely independent of, the chance of suc-
cess; it refers to the tightness of the range within
which an estimated parameter may lie (e.g., Rose,
1987, 2001; Binns and Corbett, 2012). As shown in
Figure 1, a high chance-of-success prospect may have
high or low uncertainty. It is vital to have a clear
understanding of the separation between risk and
uncertainty. Uncertainty represents the possible range
of values that a measurable quantity might have, for
which we do not have the measurement today.
As we acquire additional knowledge about a
prospect, we expect that the uncertainty should be
progressively reduced, as our knowledge of each of
the parameters becomes better constrained, so with
increasing time and knowledge and data, we know
which way we expect the uncertainty to move (it
should have a tighter range, hence lower uncertainty).
However, we should not expect the same of the
chance of success: we do not know which way it will
move. We expect that it probably will change, but by
precisely how much, and in what direction, we cannot
predict.
Because the Pg estimate is our opinion, based on
the data and knowledge available to us at the time,
and this changes with time, it is clear that Pg is an
attribute of the observer’s state of knowledge, not an
attribute of the subsurface geology. Unlike material
properties such as porosity or gross rock volume, Pg
is not a physically measurable quantity, and therefore
it does not have an associated uncertainty. It is our
opinion and our judgment at this moment, which in
theory we know precisely. However, it will change as
we gain new information. Our current estimate of Pg
may be appropriate, given the information available
to us, but it is not the “right answer” because there is
no right answer. We might, today, judge the chance
of success as being 0.35, and our peers may come to
a similar estimate given the same information.
However, if we had perfect knowledge, the chance of
success would be zero (we know the prospect fails)
or 1.0 (we know the prospect succeeds).
HOW INFORMATION CHANGES OUR
ESTIMATE OF THE CHANCE OF SUCCESS
OF A PROSPECT
Figure 2 shows how an initial Pg estimate, based on
partial knowledge, may change with time as we obtain
additional information. Each increase in knowledge
causes us to change our estimate, but since we do not
know in advance whether this will be changed for the
better or for the worse, the distribution of where our
future estimate could be increases in width from our
current perspective. Figure 3A shows the change
because of each increase in knowledge as binary in
nature (only two possibilities, either good or bad) but
the outcome may also be a distribution of intermediate
outcomes (Figure 3B).
Another variant depends on whether the new
information is a separate piece of information,
complementary to and independent of the first, which
does not replace the older information (Figure 3C), or
whether the new information updates and replaces an
older piece of information (Figure 3D). An example
of two pieces of complementary (independent)
estimated probability of success
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Figure 2. Schematic showing the progressive change of
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information as shown in Figure 3C could be a seismic
survey that informs the estimate of trap geometry, fol-
lowed by a reservoir study that sheds light on the like-
lihood of reservoir presence. Because they are
separate factors, these can give rise to four new
outcomes. Commonly, the information on the funda-
mental components of prospect risk (such as source,
reservoir, trap, and seal) might combine in this
way. An example of a second piece of information
updating or replacing an older one could be an assess-
ment of the likelihood of trap geometry based on
two-dimensional (2-D) seismic data, updated by
information gained from a subsequent and overlap-
ping three-dimensional (3-D) survey.
WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN EXPECTING:
PRIOR PROBABILITY UPDATED BY SONIC
REFLECTION DATA
We can learn about the process by comparing the pre-
diction of prospect success or failure (i.e., estimating
the Pg of a prospect) with the prediction of the gender
of an unborn child. In both cases, we start off with
minimal information, mostly based on global statis-
tics; in both cases, we can gain additional knowledge
as the prospect or baby matures, largely obtained by
bouncing seismic waves off the hidden object, which
enable us to progressively refine our estimate; and
in both cases our estimate can be tested against the
hidden reality, by birth or by drilling.
We have much better statistics on the prediction
of fetal gender during pregnancy than we do on the
prediction of prospect success prior to drilling.
Additionally, we have better intuitive understanding
of the process of prediction—we know that we
cannot change the gender of the baby by carrying
out an ultrasound examination, there is no question
of increasing our chance of a girl by gaining new
information. Yet is it surprisingly common in the
petroleum industry to hear it suggested that we expect
to de-risk prospects by acquiring 3-D data.
How we use words in common language can be
very different from how we use the same words in
formal science, and this can cause confusion when
we use these words to discuss exploration risk. In
common language, we “expect” an outcome that
commonly occurs, such as the birth of a child
(Murkoff and Mazel, 1984). It has a different mean-
ing in probability and statistics, where the expectation
is the predicted average outcome of an experiment
(or process). The expected value is the sum of [(each
of the possible outcomes) × (the probability of the
outcome occurring)]. The expected value may not
occur frequently, or may indeed never occur.
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A classic study by Efrat et al. (1999) examined the
changing reliability of fetal gender prediction in 172
singleton pregnancies at different ages of gestation.
Our initial estimate of the likelihood of a baby girl,
approximately 0.496, is based on global statistics
(World Bank, 2011). Efrat et al. (1999) showed how
ultrasound scans taken at 11, 12, and 13 weeks change
in reliability, because the fetus develops. This is an
example of updating or replacing information
(Figure 3D) since a new scan would replace rather
than augment the information from an older scan.
Figure 4, which is constructed from the data pro-
vided by Efrat et al., illustrates graphically how our
estimate of fetal gender could be modified by the
acquisition of three successive sets of new informa-
tion, provided by ultrasound scans.
The initial estimate of the chance of a girl is
0.496. Combining this with the data of Efrat et al.
allows us to calculate the full tree of possible out-
comes. The 11-week scan is of low reliability with
more cases identified as likely female (approximately
75% of results) giving a predicted chance of female of
0.625, and fewer cases identified as likely male
(approximately 25%) but with a higher reliability
(chance of male if identified as male, approximately
90%). The expected number of females after the 11-
week scan is 0.75 × 0.625 + 0.25 × 0.9 = 0.496; this
is unchanged from the initial estimate. Similarly, as
the reliability of the diagnosis increases, the confi-
dence that we can assign to each outcome improves,
but the total expected number of females is
unchanged. There is no intuitive surprise to this
because we know that ultrasound scanning cannot
change fetal gender.
We can apply exactly the same type of analysis to
the evolution of our estimate of prospect risk, which
changes as we acquire new information. All such
processes are governed by the same mathematical
relationship, known as the law of total probability.
THE LAW OF TOTAL PROBABILITY AND ITS
IMPLICATION FOR PROSPECT RISK
The law of total probability (see, e.g., Cyganowski
et al., 2002) goes back to the roots of modern proba-
bility theory, although it is unclear where it was first
formulated. Salkind (2010) noted that it is implicit to
Bayes’ theorem (Bayes, 1763) and the theory of
inverse probability (Laplace, 1774). It is a mathemati-
cal statement of the principle that was demonstrated
by the study of fetal gender prediction: the mean out-
come—the expected value of the probability of an
event, after we have the new information—is equiva-
lent to the prior probability, assessed before we have
the information. The law can be expressed as P(B) =
Pn
i=1 PðAiÞ × PðBjAiÞ where P(B) is our prior proba-
bility of an event B (for prospect Pg, event B is that a
prospect is a success). An event A (which could be
the acquisition of new information, such as 3-D seis-
mic data) can have n possible outcomes. Each out-
come has its own likelihood of occurring,
P(Ai), and each causes us to revise our estimation of
the chance of a discovery (P(B|Ai).
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For a piece of information with a simple, binary
outcome, as shown in Figure 5, the law simplifies to:
prior probability, PðBÞ = PðA1Þ×PðBjA1Þ + PðA2Þ×
PðBjA2Þ = expected value of probability after new
information.
In informal language, this is equivalent to rule (1)
of Peel and White (in press): “You should not expect
to improve Pg by acquiring new data. Some prospects
will see improved Pg, some will become worse, but
the expected value of Pg (the average of all possible
outcomes) will be unchanged.”
WHY WE EXPECT MOST PROSPECTS TO GET
WORSE WITH INCREASED INFORMATION
Exploration prospects commonly have a chance of
success significantly below 0.5; the examples shown
by Quirk and Ruthrauff (2008) documented 18 oil
and gas exploration plays, for which the overall mean
Pg was ca. 0.35, with average Pg for the individual
plays ranging from 0.2 to 0.48.
For most—but not all—types of information, we
expect that if the prior Pg is less than 0.5, there should
be more outcomes for which Pg is lowered than those
for which Pg is raised. This depends on the nature of
the information, in particular how strongly diagnostic
it is, and whether the new information results in a
symmetric or asymmetric posterior value Pg, as
shown in Figure 6. The diagnostic strength measures
the difference in revised probability between the good
news and bad news outcomes. Symmetry of outcome
measures whether the Pg given good news is equal to
the chance of failure (1-Pg), given bad news (e.g.,
positive news updates Pg to 0.9, negative news
updates it to 0.1).
Fully Diagnostic Information
If the information is very strongly diagnostic of likely
success or failure, giving revised probability close to
0 and 1, the proportion of outcomes with raised Pg
is equal to the prior Pg. For typical prospects with
prior Pg < 0.5, we expect fully diagnostic informa-
tion to downgrade more than half of the outcomes
(Figure 6A). For example, if prior Pg = 0.35, we
expect fully diagnostic information to downgrade
65% of the outcomes (Figure 6A), but the mean of
the outcomes is unchanged at 0.35.
Symmetrically Diagnostic Information
If the new information is symmetrically diagnostic
and prior Pg < 0.5, we also expect more downgrades
than upgrades (Figure 6B), but the mean of the out-
comes is unchanged.
Asymmetrically Diagnostic Information
Some types of new information create an asymmetric
outcome, and some of these may result in more out-
comes being upgraded than those that are down-
graded. For example, sparse 2-D seismic data may
be sufficient to reveal that a trap does not have a valid
closure, giving updated probability of 0.1 or less, but
the same data might not be capable of demonstrating
that the trap definitely does close, so it cannot boost
trap likelihood to 0.9. If the asymmetry is skewed to
the downside, the law of total probability dictates that
the number of outcomes should be skewed toward
the upside to match. In the example with prior Pg of
0.35, a piece of information with possible outcomes
0.1 (if bad news) or 0.5 (if good news) would imply
that 63% of outcomes should see upgraded Pg
(Figure 6C); but the mean of the outcomes is
unchanged at 0.35.
This simple analysis demonstrates that for most
types of information we can expect to receive, and
for a prospect with initial Pg less than 0.5, we should
expect that, more often than not, new work and new
information will cause our Pg estimate to be lowered.
This is not a universal rule; for some information
types that have strongly asymmetric results that can
condemn more effectively than they can prove in
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favor, we should expect more upgrade outcomes than
downgrade outcomes. For the fortunate few explora-
tion prospects with Pg > 0.5, the converse is true
and we expect new information to upgrade Pg more
commonly than it downgrades—with the same pro-
viso about asymmetry.
In informal language, this is equivalent to rule (2)
of Peel and White (in press): “you should expect Pg
to become worse for the majority of prospects.”
APPLICATION TO A SIMULATED PROSPECT
It would be instructive to create a study of the
progressive evolution of estimated Pg of real pros-
pects, based on successive information, comparable
to the fetal gender study, using real examples.
However, this is not possible, because to do so we
would have to gain information on hundreds of
near-identical prospects, studied in near-identical
sequence using near-identical methods. We would
also require access to a complete historical record
showing the progressive evolution of the Pg estimate
for each prospect. However, all prospects are differ-
ent, the nature of the information we gain is different
in each prospect, and there is no data set tracking the
evolution of Pg estimates. It is, however, possible to
take one prospect (in this case, a synthetic one) and
to examine all the possible outcomes of the different
types of information and their impact on Pg estimates.
We recognize that this synthetic prospect is artificial,
and we do not claim that this is representative of all
real-world prospects; however, it represents a typical
prospect based on the authors’ experience of
hundreds of geological prospects across different
exploration companies, and the results serve to
inform our understanding of how Pg is expected to
change in real-world examples.
Our example has an initially estimated Pg of
0.25, obtained by multiplication of the chance of four
independent prospect risk components: reservoir
(prior chance 0.72), seal (prior chance 0.5), trap (prior
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Figure 6. The effect of new information on the estimated chance of success (Pg) depends on the type of information: whether the
outcome is symmetric (A–C) or asymmetric (D–F), and how strongly diagnostic it is (A = fully diagnostic; B and D = strongly diagnostic;
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chance 0.86), and source (prior chance 0.81). We
plan to gain information on each of these compo-
nents, and can model the possible outcomes of each
piece of information. For each component, for the
purpose of this model we have estimated how the
component chance will be modified in the event of
good news or bad news, plus the chance of a good
or a bad outcome (Figure 7A). Each of the component
estimates shown in Figure 7A is consistent with the
law of total probability; thus for each component,
Pg estimate resulting from that outcome
ch
an
ce
 o
f o
ut
co
m
e
0.0
1.0
prior estimate of Pg
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Original estimate
of Pg = 0.25
after 1 piece of information
2 possible classes of outcome
with different likelihoods
weighted mean of Pg = 0.25
expected value
0.25 successes
Pg estimate resulting from that outcome
e
m
oct
u
o
 f
o
 
ec
n
ahc
0.0
1.0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
after 2 pieces of information
4 possible classes of outcome
expected value
0.25 successes
Pg estimate resulting from that outcome
e
m
oct
u
o
 f
o
 
ec
n
ah c
0.0
1.0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Pg estimate resulting from that outcome
e
m
oct
u
o
 f
o
 
ec
n
ah c
0.0
1.0
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
t
 f
 
after 3 pieces of information
8 possible classes of outcome
expected value
0.25 successes
after 4 pieces of information
16 possible classes of
outcome
expected value
0.25 successes
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
reservoir
information
received
0.7
0.35
0.33
0.33
likelihood that an
individual outcome
will have improved Pg
rel. to starting value
0.7
likelihood that an
individual outcome
will have improved Pg
rel. to starting value
0.35
likelihood that an
individual outcome
will have improved Pg
rel. to starting value
0.33
likelihood that an
individual outcome
will have improved Pg
rel. to starting value
0.33
after seal
information
received
after trap
information
received
after source
information
received
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
component elements of the prospect chance of success
up
down
updown
up
down
up
down
possible changes in the prospect chance of success given new information
reservoir component
updated
probability
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.72prior probability
0.3 0.7
0.3 0.9
0.5 0.5
0.1 0.9
seal component
updated
probability
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.5prior probability
0.05 0.95
0.15 0.9
trap component
updated
probability
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.86prior probability
0.3 0.7
0.4 0.99
source component
updated
probability
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0.81prior probability
Figure 7. Results of simulating the progressive maturation of a prospect, in which information is gained on each of four independent
risk components. Pg = chance of success.
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the weighted average of the updated (conditional)
probabilities is equal to the prior probability for that
component. The way in which the prior component
chance is updated by new information is based on real
examples. To take the example of the source compo-
nent (which considers source presence, richness,
maturity, expulsion, migration, etc.), we considered
the impact of information gained in the form of
seabed drop-coring. Detection of oil seeps at surface
is strongly indicative of a working source system,
with migration from source up past the prospect to
sea floor, so a positive outcome from the coring pro-
gram updates our perceived chance of a working
source system to near-proven (0.99). However, a neg-
ative result in the drop-core program is suggestive,
but not condemnatory (there are many reasons why
seeps may not be detected) and the downward-
revised outcome is not as severe (0.4).
The calculated possible outcomes are shown in
Figure 7B–E. The crossplots show how the estimate
of overall Pg changes from its initial value of 0.25
as information is gained, in succession, on the four
components.
The first piece of information gained will resolve
some issues regarding the reservoir (Figure 7B).
There are two classes of outcome relative to the origi-
nal estimate, with 0.7 of the outcomes seeing upgraded
Pg and 0.3 seeing downgraded Pg. For this change, the
effect of the asymmetry of the information (Figure 7A)
outweighs the effect of having original Pg < 0.5,
resulting in more upgrade outcomes than downgrade
outcomes. But the expected value (the mean of all
outcomes) remains unchanged at a value of 0.25.
As more pieces of information are gathered, the
effect of having original Pg < 0.5 outweighs the
effect of any information asymmetry, and the number
of downgraded outcomes inexorably increases. When
we gain information on seal, the likelihood that an
individual outcome is upgraded from the original Pg
estimate goes down to 0.35, and the next information
on trap reduces this likelihood to 0.33. However, in
every case the expected value (mean of all the out-
comes) is unchanged.
This calculation exercise is informative: it
provides a good demonstration that the law of
total probability does indeed apply to a typical work
plan for a typical exploration prospect. The new
information causes us to change our Pg estimate pro-
gressively, but the expected value of the new Pg (the
mean of all possible outcomes) is unchanged. The
exercise conforms to the two rules of Peel and
White (in press).
The more pieces of information we acquire, the
more likely it is that the outcome has lower Pg than
the prior value (but the average of those outcomes
remains constant).
PLAYS AND GROUPS OF PROSPECTS WITH
RISK DEPENDENCY
Discussion so far in this paper has focused on an indi-
vidual prospect. A portfolio of prospects may be fully
independent, or the prospects may have a degree of
dependency, so that information that changes our
estimate of Pg of one prospect affects the whole
group. For a suite of prospects in an unproven hydro-
carbon play, we may be able to separate out a play
risk that applies equally to all prospects in the group
(White, 1993). The law of total probability applies
equally to dependent groups and plays; new data
may allow us to change the play risk, but we do not
know whether the new data will make it better or
worse, and the mean of all possible outcomes is, as
before, zero net change.
MANAGING A PORTFOLIO OF PROSPECTS
(CHANGING THE AVERAGE CHANCE OF
SUCCESS BY SELECTIVE CULLING AND NEW
PROSPECT IDENTIFICATION)
Although the arguments made previously can be rig-
orously justified for a portfolio consisting of a static
group of already-identified opportunities, real-world
conditions commonly make it possible to change the
average chance of success of an actual portfolio by
adding new prospects and culling low-ranking ones.
In a “free market” of prospects, in which we have
no drilling commitments and are free to choose which
to drill and which to cull, this can result in significant
value addition. If we initially had 10 prospects in a
lease area, each of the type described in shown in
Figure 7, with initial Pg of 0.25, we would expect
after gaining additional information to have some
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looking better (higher Pg) and some worse (lower
Pg). If the forward model is representative of the
prospects, the most likely outcome is to end up with
two prospects raised to about Pg = 0.7, one raised to
Pg = 0.3, one near-unchanged at Pg = 0.24, and the
rest with significantly lowered Pg values < 0.15.
The average Pg of the portfolio is unchanged at
0.25, and the expected number of successes, if we
drill all of them, is unchanged at 2.5 successes.
If we can cull the prospects that now appear less
attractive, with a culling threshold of Pg = 0.2, we
are left with four survivors, whose average Pg is
raised to about 0.5.
The new information has potentially added value,
not by increasing the number of expected
successes (which has, in fact, fallen slightly, to 2.2)
but by eliminating the cost of drilling the six culled
prospects, which are likely to be failures. Depending
on the exploration maturity of the lease area, it may
be possible to replace the culled prospects by identi-
fying new ones with which to refresh the portfolio.
However, this method of improving average Pg
by culling and introducing new prospects does not
apply in settings where there is no optionality (e.g.,
where the terms of the lease dictate a fixed set of
commitment wells, and no new opportunities can be
identified and substituted).
DISCUSSION
Although we cannot and should not expect to de-risk
prospects by gaining new knowledge about them,
there is clearly real value to having new knowledge.
The increase in value does not arise from an increase
in the expected number of successes from an estab-
lished prospect portfolio, nor from an expectation of
increasing the risked prospective resource. The VoI
lies in the ability to make decisions using that infor-
mation: VoI theory is abundantly documented else-
where (Howard, 1966; Howard and Matheson, 1981;
Coopersmith and Cunningham, 2002; Coopersmith
et al., 2006; for a review of VoI literature, see
Bratvold and Begg, 2008, 2010; Bratvold et al.,
2009), and it is not the purpose of this paper
to restate VoI theory. For a portfolio of existing
prospects, the principal increase in full-cycle value
comes from deciding which prospects not to drill,
thereby saving the cost of a likely dry hole: increasing
the estimated Pg of a prospect which was due to be
drilled in any case has no value, because it did not
change any decision. Value is also added if valid
new information raises the estimated Pg of an
existing prospect that previously had not been a
drill-worthy candidate, leading to it being promoted
from nondrill to drill. The identification of depend-
ency groups (prospects which have a component of
shared risk, so that information gained on one pros-
pect may affect the Pg estimate of the whole group)
allows the VoI to be maximized.
Other sources of real value derived from the new
knowledge may include identification of new con-
cepts, new plays, and new prospects.
As well as giving us a better understanding of
how and why prospect Pg changes with increased
knowledge, awareness of the basic principles informs
our day-to-day activities, for example:
• It may be unwise to enter a performance con-
tract that includes a commitment to improve
Pg of a prospect or prospect portfolio (unless
the prior Pg > 0.5, this is likely to lead to
failure); good work done well may lead to a
more reliable Pg estimate, but it is more likely
to be a reduced Pg estimate.
• Pay attention if a team is working on a large
group of prospects, and they all apparently
improve in Pg. Although the expected value of
the average Pg change is zero, it is unlikely to
be exactly zero, and the overall change could
be positive or negative; but a major shift needs
to be explained. It may be that the prospects all
fall within a dependency group, and that
the shared risk has changed (note that shared risk
may go up or down); it may be the luck of the
draw. But a persistent, year-on-year improve-
ment in Pg across a large number of prospects
may be an indicator of nongeological influences.
• If a prospect-risking method automatically
penalizes a prospect for not having certain data
types (e.g., deducts Pg points if there is only
2-D seismic data), or automatically rewards it
for other activities, the risking method should
be considered suspect.
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CONCLUSIONS
Undrilled prospects and unborn children are subject
to the same laws of probability; in both cases, we
have an unknown outcome, and we acquire informa-
tion of progressively increasing reliability to improve
our estimate of the chance of the outcome. But we do
not expect gaining information on the gender of a
fetus to change its gender, and we should not expect
acquisition of new information to de-risk a prospect.
It is possible to derive meaningful statistics for a
situation like prenatal screening because the same
process is carried out on multiple, repeatable test
cases, with the same prior probabilities; but to do so
for real exploration prospects is impractical because
each prospect is different, with different prior proba-
bilities and different information acquired. However,
we can use exploration experience to create a syn-
thetic prospect which can be fully analyzed in a
repeatable way. The results of this analysis are con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions.
The expected value of Pg after gaining new infor-
mation is unchanged: the actual value may be
increased or decreased, but the mean of all possible
outcomes is no change.
Given the nature of real-world geological pros-
pects (typical Pg < 0.5), and the nature of the infor-
mation we typically gain about them prior to
drilling, we expect that a majority of prospects will
suffer reduced Pg given new information, but the
minority that improve do so by a greater amount
than the majority that become worse, so the average
outcome is unchanged.
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